We describe laboratory experiments that produce behavioral spillovers across strategic contexts. In these experiments subjects play two distinct games simultaneously with different opponents. We find that behavior is highly context dependent: when games are paired in ensembles, play differs from the isolated controls. Behavior is also influenced by which other game composes the ensemble, and in predicted ways. These results suggest that people do not treat each strategic situation in isolation but instead construct heuristics that they apply across games. The results reject the hypothesis that subjects play games independently; instead the findings imply that the effect of a particular institution on behavior depends upon the full institutional context. The results have implications for any attempt to transport institutions across contexts, including developmental programs and constitutional designs.
Introduction
Policies geared toward the economic improvement of developing nations or the establishment of democracy often fail. Part of the reason for this failure may be institutional mismatch. Some scholars have focused on how beliefs and trust can bootstrap market based institutions (e.g. North 2006 , Greif 2006 . Here, we consider an alternative based on behavioral repertoires. Rather than thinking of actors as optimizing given a set of beliefs, we characterize actors as adapting behavioral repertoires that they apply across multiple strategic contexts. Using an experimental design, we explore the degree to which behaviors necessary for the well functioning of one institution are compatible with the patterns of behavior created by another institutional form.
Our behavioral repertoires approach offers an alternative way to interpret recent studies that reveal systematic inter-population variance in subjects' responses to common incentive structures. This empirical evidence on diverse population level reactions to institutions spans multiple methodologies, including cross national surveys (Ingelhart 1990) , laboratory experiments (Henrich et al 2001 (Henrich et al , 2004 , and real world choices (Fernandez and Fogli 2007) .
We propose that one reason that different societies react differently to common choice situations is that when confronted with a game, people build from or employ existing behavioral rules. This hypothesis implies behavioral spillovers across game.
Conventionally, game theorists have analyzed play in isolated games, and experimental economics has focused on subjects who play single games, where their behavior is observed for isolated strategic environments. If behavior is context dependent, then an analysis of isolated strategic situations cannot explain variation in response to identical incentives. To that end, we construct a set of experiments in which subjects play multiple games simultaneously and examine whether attributes of one game influence behavior in other games.
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Rather than depend upon diverse population 1 Our design therefore differs from experiments in which subjects play distinct games sequentially characteristics (such as wealth, education, risk, etc) to explain behavioral variation, we offer an alternative explanation: the effect of the institutional context. Bednar and Page 2007 offer a theoretical approach to the study of institutional context on behavior, developing a model of multiple game analysis. In this study we develop laboratory experiments to study the effect of multiple-game play on subject's behavior. Subjects are presented with two games on their screen at the same time and are asked to indicate how they would like to play in each game. Other than having the two games presented on the screen simultaneously, there is no indication to the subject that the games are linked, and the subject is free to develop distinct strategies to each.
We are interested in the possibility that the implicit standard hypothesis from game theory of game independence does not reflect the way that human subjects respond to contextual strategic environments. Instead, we are interested in the possibility of externalities between games. We study two effects: behavioral spillovers between games and cognitive load. We posit specific hypotheses for each type of effect. The results strongly support our hypotheses: We find that behavior varies significantly from control treatments when games are played simultaneously. Furthermore, behavior in one game depends upon what other game is included in the two-game ensemble. This trend suggests that variance is not (exclusively) attributable to cognitive overload, but instead indicates the presence of behavioral externalities.
Finally, behavior suggestive of cognitive overload is most present where predicted.
Why does this matter? Even if we can produce these behavioral spillovers in the laboratory, why should social scientists take notice? If we find evidence of the importance of institutional context for behavior, we demonstrate two possibilities with wide ranging implications. First, we provide an incentive-based explanation for some portion of the variation in institutional performance seen empirically. Our results would suggest that ensemble effects-externalities generated by the complete set of incento create framing and learning effects. See for example Frolich and Oppenheimer (1996) . tive structures that an individual confronts-contribute to these differences. Second, to the extent that experiments like ours can show which combinations of institutions can coexist successfully, then they can help to explain why markets and democracies take off in some societies but do not in others. And, in some cases, experiments such as these might even inform the choice over institutions in designing political and economic transitions.
We have organized the paper as follows. In the next section, we propose a model and derive hypotheses testing the null of game independence against our two posited effects, behavioral spillovers and cognitive load. We also include a description of the specific games included in this study. Section 3 describes our experimental design.
Sections 4 and 5 report our findings. Section 4 displays the results from our control treatment of games played in isolation. Section 5 presents the ensemble effects, first reporting the changes in behavior between the control and ensemble play, and next examining significant differences between ensembles that share a game in common.
In Section 6 we discuss what these findings might mean and comment on potential future directions. In an appendix, we include tables of all behaviors observed in the laboratory and the levels of significant difference between the control and ensemble play. We generally report two behavioral proportions: one that is an average across all rounds, and a second that focuses on later rounds, to get a sense of behavioral adaptation during play. Using these comparisons we are able to offer a test of a learning model (which would hypothesize that play would become increasingly Pareto optimal) against a spillover model, where subjects would increasingly apply heuristics.
Model and Hypotheses
We focus on four two-by-two games: the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), Strong Alternation (SA), Weak Alternation (WA), and a Self Interest game (SI). The individual games belong to a class of two-person two-action games that contain a selfish action (S) and an alternative; in three of the games, this alternative is cooperative. In three of the games, cooperation lowers a player's own payoff and raises the payoff of the other and being selfish does the opposite, so in the one shot game, the unique dominant strategy equilibrium involves both players choosing selfish. In the fourth game, Self-Interest (SI), selfish behavior is both the stage game dominant strategy and Pareto optimal.
The first game is a standard Prisoner's Dilemma, where the stage game has a dominant strategy equilibrium, (S, S), which is Pareto dominated by (C, C). Note that (C, C) also maximizes the joint payoff of the two players. C S Prisoner's Dilemma: C 7, 7 2,10 (PD) S 10,2 4,4
In the second and third games, Strong Alternation (SA) and Weak Alternation Their agent based models showed that simple learning rules could locate the proposed equilibria. That paper provides a theoretical foundation for the current paper: Here we test whether the phenomena derived within models and generated by artificial agents can be produced in a laboratory with real people. Specifically, we expect:
Games paired with Self-Interest will exhibit more selfishness.
• [H3]: Games paired with the Prisoner's Dilemma will exhibit more cooperation.
• [H4]: Games paired with Strong Alternation or Weak Alternation will exhibit more alternation, with more significant effects in Strong Alternation.
• [H5]: Behavioral spillovers will increase over the series.
The final behavior spillover hypothesis is not a specific prediction, but rather an interest to test two competing hypotheses: growing inclination to apply heuristics versus a standard learning model where subjects grope their way toward payoff-maximizing play. The latter alternative is related to the independence hypothesis. H5 is supported if spillover effects increase through the series; we may interpret this as evidence of a growing prediliction to apply a successful strategy elsewhere. This effect may be particularly strong if the strategy requires orchestrated coordination, such as with WA or SA. However, this tendency may be overcome as the rounds progress, and the players gain experience: initial cross-application of one game's successful strategy may diminish as the subject is able to turn attention to solving the other game in the ensemble. We therefore offer the fourth as a "test" hypothesis; not a prediction, but an inquiry.
Support for these hypotheses is evidence that behavior from one game in the ensemble bleeds over into other games. Note that to guard against coordination focality as an explanation for this phenomenon, players are matched with different opponents for each of the two games, a design feature that we discuss in more detail when describing the experiments.
Secondly, we developed a partial ordering of the four games based upon the strength of the incentives for the subjects to reach Pareto optimal play. We focus on the Pareto optimal outcome that gives both players identical payoffs. In the Self Interest game the dominant strategy equilibrium is also Pareto optimal, so this is the simplest game. In the other three games, repeated game strategies are necessary to sustain the Pareto optimal outcome. The coordinated equilibrium of Alternation requires that the two players synchronize their behaviors; it is more difficult to coordinate on this behavior than the relatively easier mutual cooperation that sustains the Pareto optimal outcome in PD. Given this logic, and given that the incentives to alternate are only slightly greater than cooperation, Weak Alternation is the most difficult game to play efficiently. We do not rank SA and PD; while PD has the coordination advantage, the incentives in SA are strong. In sum, we posit that Self
Interest is the easiest game to play and Weak Alternation the most difficult, and this relative difficulty will be reflected in subjects' behavior.
H6-7: Cognitive Load Subject's choice of action will be affected by the difficulty of the game.
• [H6]: Game play should correlate with ease of play, with behavior in SI the most efficient and WA the least.
• [H7]: Cognitive load spillover effects will be most prevalent in games played with more difficult games. In particular, subjects will exhibit more sub-optimal behavior in SA and PD when either game is played with WA.
These final hypotheses convey our interest in the experiment's ability to reveal limitations in the cognitive processing of subjects playing multiple games simultaneously. While there are no design features to the experiments that would preclude the subjects from optimizing in each game, we believe that when subjects are asked to solve two games simultaneously they will not be as efficient as they are when playing an isolated game. In particular, with [H7] when an ensemble contains WA, we predict more selfish behavior in PD or SA-an outcome that is third best. The relative ease of playing SI means that it should generally be free of contextual effects, and play in the control treatments should approximate play in the ensemble treatments [H6].
Experimental Design
Our experiments consist of four control sessions, each of which consists of a single game, and 14 treatment sessions, each of which consists of a pair of games. This experimental design enables us to determine the effects of ensemble on behavior by comparing the ensemble with the corresponding control sessions and to compare behavior across ensembles.
The control sessions follow the standard protocol of infinitely repeated games in the laboratory. We have one 12-player session for each of the single games. Participants are randomly matched into pairs at the beginning of each session, and play the same match for the entire experiment. In each session, participants first play the game for 200 rounds. After round 200, whether the game will continue to the next round depends on the "throw of the die" that is determined by the computer's random number generator. At the end of each round after round 200, with 90% chance, the game will continue to the next round. With 10% chance, the game stops. In other words, we implement an infinitely repeated game, with a discount factor of 1 for the first 200 rounds, and 0.9 thereafter. With the chosen discount factors, (C, C)
can be sustained as a repeated game equilibrium in PD, SA and WA. With 12 players in each control session, we have 6 independent observations for each single game.
In the ensemble treatment, we again use twelve players in each session. Within each session, at the beginning, each player is randomly matched with two other participants, both of whom will be her matches for the entire experiment. She plays two distinct games with each of these people. This design allows us to analyze whether or not behavior in one game is influenced by the nature of the other game. As in the control sessions, we implement an infinitely repeated game, with a discount factor of 1 for the first 200 rounds, and 0.9 thereafter. Within each session, the 12 players are partitioned into independent groups of 4 each, We used z-Tree to program our experiments. As z-Tree does not record the mouse movements within each stage, we ran two additional sessions with ensembles, (SI, WA) and (WA, SI), where we use the software Morae to record the mouse movement.
These two sessions will allow us to determine the order of decisions within each round.
The (SI, WA) session has 12 subjects, while the (WA, SI) has only eight subjects.
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[ Table 1 about here.] Table 1 reports the features of experimental sessions, including the name of the game, the number of players in each session, the number of independent pairs for each 3 The matching protocol is the following: 4 − 2 − 1 − 3 , 6 − 5 − 7 − 8 , 10 − 9 − 11 − 12 form three independent groups, each with four participants positioned on a circle, and each participant plays her left and right match. 4 We recruited for twelve subjects, however, only eight showed up.
control session, the ensemble of games, the number of players in each session, as well as the number of independent groups in each ensemble session.
Overall, 18 independent computerized sessions were conducted in the RCGD lab at the University of Michigan from March to October 2007, yielding a total of 212 subjects. Our subjects were students from the University of Michigan, recruited by email from a subject pool for economic experiments. 
Results
We first outline the basic results from the control sessions on the individual games.
We then report results from the ensembles, comparing behavior in the ensemble with that in the control, as well as behavior across ensembles.
Control Sessions
In this subsection, we report the results from the control sessions. In addition to supporting the derivation of our ranking of the games for the cognitive load hypotheses, these results provide a benchmark from which we can interpret the ensemble results.
As the games are implemented as infinitely repeated games, there can be many repeated game strategies. In the analysis, we restrict ourselves to three simple repeated games strategies, SS, CC and ALT. (Elaborate ...) When we represent repeated game strategies with automata, these strategies are the simplest, i.e., whose automaton representation has the least number of states. There have been empirical evidence that simple repeated game strategies are more likely to be chosen (Baron and Kalai 1993).
In addition to the simplicity argument, data in the control sessions also support our focus on simple strategies.
[ Figure 2 about here.]
We first present the time series data for each pair in each of the control sessions. [ Figure 4 about here.]
Lastly, Figure 4 presents the dynamics from the Weak Alternation game. In this game, only two out of six pairs develops an alternating behavior, two pairs cooperate, one (pair 4) converge to SS, and the last pair (pair 6) does not seem to have converged to a stable outcome. In sum, none of the simple strategies emerges as the dominant choice of the subjects. Therefore, we speculate that, while subject behavior in WA is more likely to be influenced by the other game in an ensemble, when paired with other games, it might increase the subjects' cognitive load.
[ Table 2 about here.]
We now summarize the results in the control sessions. We next compare the efficiency of each game. Efficiency is defined as the actual total payoffs of the two players divided by the maximum joint payoffs.
[ Table 4 about here.] Table 4 presents the average efficiency achieved in each control session, as well as the p-values for pairwise comparisons using the permutation tests. In the analysis, the average efficiency achieved by each pair in a session is an independent observation.
Result 2. In the control sessions, the SI game generates significantly higher efficiency than any other game, while pairwise efficiency comparison is not significant between
the PD, SA and WA games.
Support. In Table 4, each pairwise comparison between SI and the other three games is significant at the 1% or 5% level, while none of the other pairwise comparisons is significant at the 10% level.
From the control sessions, in SI, the Pareto efficient stage game Nash equilibrium is played 99.86 percent of the times overall, and 100 percent in the last 100 rounds.
We can characterize the game in terms of simplicity, i.e., the number of automata needed in playing the simple strategies. The both SI and PD are simpler than SA and WA. If we use decision time as a proxy for mental activities needed to play the game, SI take less time per round than any other game, followed by PD, which is in turn followed by SA and WA.
Ensemble Effects
We present our results comparing both control and ensemble play and behavioral differences in particular games compared across ensembles. To briefly summarize, we find, as expected, evidence of behavioral spillovers across games. In some cases, those spillovers are stronger than we anticipated and in others weaker. For example, when
Weak Alternation is paired with Self Interest, players prove far more likely to take the same action period after period in Weak Alternation. In contrast, in the pairing of Weak Alternation and the Prisoners' Dilemma, we do not get as much play of CC in the Weak Alternation game as we expected. Both of these results are likely to represent the confounding effect of cognitive load on behavioral spillovers, which we anticipated to be most significant with WA.
Comparing Control and Ensemble
Our anticipation was that subjects would play particular games differently between the control treatments, where they played a single game, and when that game appeared as part of an ensemble. This prediction emerges from the two core hypotheses:
both cognitive taxes and behavioral spillovers will affect play in ensembles. We do not rule out the possibility that subjects use supergame strategies (to be elaborated).
Here we highlight some results from the data that support these expectations.
[ Table 5 ; the proportion of selfish behavior exhibited in both PD and SA more than double when these games are paired with SI. The effect on the Prisoner's Dilemma is particularly salient given the game's ubiquity in the social sciences: it appears highly vulnerable to selfish contextual influence, and subjects do not recover in later rounds but instead maintain the selfish behavior. The change in behavior in WA is not significant, but as WA did not exhibit strong behavioral tendencies when played in isolation, the lack of significance does not surprise us.
Result 4. Compared to the corresponding control sessions, in (SA, PD) and (SA, SI), the proportion of ALT in SA is significantly less than that in SA played in isola-
tion.
[ [ [ Table 9 about here.]
Lastly, we compare the efficiency in the control and ensemble sessions. Table 9 presents the average efficiency in the control and ensemble sessions. For each ensemble, we present the efficiency of each game in the ensemble, as well as the overall ensemble efficiency. Result 6 follows directly from the comparison of behavior between the control and ensembles.
Comparing Behavior Between Ensembles
A second method for investigating the presence of behavioral spillovers and cognitive overload is to compare behavior between ensembles. The effect of behavioral spillovers on play in the PD is most significantly seen between ensembles. We also highlight key results in WA and SA play. Lastly, comparing (SA, PD) and (SA, SI), subjects played CC more often in SA when paired with PD (14% versus 7%). In later rounds, the effect grows even more pronounced: while they continue to play CC in SA when it is paired with PD, where SA is paired with SI subjects shift from CC to ALT, so that the final CC percentages are 14% in (SA, PD) versus 1% in (SA, SI), a difference significant at the .01 level
In general, the experimental results agree with our hypotheses: game independence is not supported, but instead subjects are influenced by contextual effects of behavioral spillovers and cognitive load. The exception is [H5]: We did not find unambiguous support for increasing cross-application of heuristics; arguably, behavioral spillovers decrease over time, in support of a learning hypothesis (To be completed).
Discussion
In this paper, we describe an experimental study to test for ensemble effects in game playing behavior. Our study reveals strong evidence of behavioral spillovers that depend in predictable ways on features of the games in the ensemble. In particular, if subjects play one game in an ensemble that encourages selfishness or cooperation, then they are more likely to exhibit that behavior in the other game in their ensemble. We also see evidence of cognitive overload when ensembles include the Weak Alternation game.
Our findings that show how a person's behavior in a given game depends on the ensemble of strategic situations that the person faces calls into question both the theoretical and empirical analysis of isolated games as well as the standard mechanism design assumption that incentives can be considered independent of the broader behavioral context. They also provides a possible path toward greater understanding of cross organizational and cross national differences in the performance of specific institutions or game forms.
In future work, we hope to consider an experimental design that adds games to the ensemble sequentially. To experimentalists, who worry about contaminated subject pools, a finding of sequential effects would not be a huge surprise. However, if we can learn how people play one in one game depends upon they other games they face, then if we know the current ensemble of strategic choices that a population confronts, we can gain insights into how they might behave when confronted with a new institutionalized game form -such as a market or democratic mechanism.
Moreover, evidence of sequential behavioral spillovers would imply that potential for a theory of institutional path dependence based on behavioral spillovers (Page 2006 ).
As with any laboratory experiment, our results may not translate to the larger world. People often rely on contextual clues to behave differently in distinct situations. Thus, people can act altruistically to their children but competitively at work.
We do not deny the human capacity to bracket contexts and act accordingly. However, we believe that such contextual bracketing requires cognitive effort and that, in general, people will seek out consistent behaviors that apply across multiple settings.
Our experiments support that hypothesis.
A second potential criticism pertains to the simplicity of the games we consider.
Would these effects continue to hold for more complex games embedded in a richer institutional and cultural context? We cannot answer that question in a laboratory.
But the fact that the game ensembles can influence behaviors in individual games in a relatively sterile laboratory would seem to suggest that such effects might also exist in the real world as well.
To summarize, these experiments demonstrate that significant ensemble effects 
